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I. INTRODUCTION
Territorial boundaries, if well-established and recognized,
add stability to relations between neighbor states.' Unclear
boundary demarcations, however, often lead to disputes that sig-
nificantly hamper state relations.2 While maritime boundary dis-
1. See Jan Paulsson, Boundary Disputes into the Twenty-First Century: Why,
How . . . and Who?, 95 Am. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 122 (2001) (expressing that stable
boundaries reduce the likelihood of conflict or dispute between neighbor states).
2. See id. at 122-23 (realizing that boundary disputes may result in armed
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putes directly affect a state's citizens,3 they often affect economic
relations between disputing states as well.4 If states' claims of
sovereignty of maritime territory and resources located therein
conflict, disputes may quickly escalate unless states employ an
effective means of dispute resolution.5
For example, Venezuela currently maintains a dispute over
the sovereignty of Isla de Aves ("Aves Island") with various Carib-
bean states.' Venezuela and Dominica, in particular,7 claim sover-
eignty of Aves Island and the natural resources located in its
surrounding maritime territory." Because neither Venezuela nor
Dominica appear willing to compromise,9 the increasing tension
conflict which thereby threatens international peace and security); see also ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 217 (2001) (conveying that states which use force to
settle disputes may also weaken relations with other states not party to the dispute
because the international community is globally interconnected).
3. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 123 (noting that the delimitation of maritime
territories may reapportion the property and resources of states' citizens).
4. See Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks That Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1999) (commenting that a primary question underlying disputes
over contested maritime territory is that of sovereignty to the territory and the
economic resources located in the maritime territory); see also Paulsson, supra note 1,
at 123 (recognizing that maritime disputes "can have significant implications for
[states'] ownership and control of resources").
5. See Srecko "Lucky" Vidmar, Compulsory Inter-State Arbitration of Territorial
Disputes, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 87, 89 (2002) (asserting that disputes which
remain unresolved are likely to escalate to armed conflict).
6. See Christopher Toothaker, A Big Deal over a Tiny Island: Chavez Asserts
Nation's Claim to Isla de Aves, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 18, 2005, at 18A (pointing
out that Caribbean island states including Dominica, Antigua, Grenada, Monstserrat,
and St. Vincent object to Venezuela's claim of sovereignty of Aves Island).
7. See Nick Foster, Venezuela Plans Birth of Baby to Colonise Bird Island, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (UK), Aug. 27, 2005, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/news2005/08!27/wvenez27.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/08/27/
ixworld.html (implying Dominica is the predominant Caribbean state objecting to
Venezuela's claim of sovereignty of Aves Island); see also Caribbean Community to
Hold Talks About Disputed Bird Island with Venezuela, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 4,
2006 [hereinafter Caribbean Community to Hold Talks] (reporting that the "United
States, France and the Dominican Republic have recognized Venezuela's ownership"
of Aves Island).
8. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (reporting that Venezuela and Dominica have not
agreed upon the sovereignty of Aves Island, its surrounding maritime territory, or the
fishery and natural resources located therein). "[M]ore than sovereignty is at stake"
in the Aves Island dispute. Alexandra Olson, Latin Border Dispute Takes Wing with
Ayes Isle, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at 14. Access to the Island's fishery and natural
resources underlie the dispute. Id. Access to the maritime territory's "mining,
petroleum, and natural gas rights" might result in billion dollar revenues for either
Venezuela or Dominica. Id.
9. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (conveying that both Venezuela and Dominica
avidly claim sovereignty to Aves Island and reporting that their dispute continues to
stagnate "despite Venezuela's recent agreement to sell Caribbean nations fuel under
preferential terms").
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between the states may result in armed conflict unless they
engage in preemptive dispute resolution.10
States that engage in preemptive dispute resolution fre-
quently call upon adjudicative or diplomatic means to resolve
boundary disputes and comply with international law.' In light of
reduced efficacy of bilateral dispute resolution mechanisms, how-
ever, some scholars propose that states should engage in stan-
dardized compulsory arbitration subject to review by the
International Court of Justice ("I.C.J.") to resolve boundary dis-
putes.2 Although arbitration is recognized as an effective method
of international dispute resolution in certain cases, 3 standardized
arbitration will not effectively resolve all boundary disputes
between neighbor states because of the different factual circum-
stances and legal principles that underlie and govern territorial
disputes. 4
This Comment argues against the proposition that the United
Nations ("U.N.") should implement a standardized arbitration
mechanism and discusses implications of such a requirement on
the current dispute over the sovereignty of Aves Island.' Part I
presents the claims of sovereignty of Venezuela and Dominica
10. Cf. Julie M. Folger, A Proposal to End the Stalemate in the Caspian Sea
Negotiations, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 529, 530 (2003) (discussing the need for
states to use dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve the dispute over the oil-rich
Caspian Sea in an effort to prevent the dispute from escalating to armed conflict).
11. See Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement: A Network of
Cooperational Duties, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2003) (classifying dispute resolution
methods as either diplomatic-political or adjudicative-legal in nature).
12. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 88-89 (reasoning the U.N. should implement
compulsory arbitration through a general resolution or treaty because it currently
places no affirmative duty on states to arbitrate disputes).
13. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (enumerating arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution which U.N. Member States may employ in resolving their
disputes); see also Carla S. Copeland, The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial
Disputes, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3107 (1999) (noting that arbitration is an
appropriate method to resolve territorial boundary disputes in certain
circumstances); Vidmar, supra note 5, at 101 (attributing the effectiveness of
arbitration to its impartial processes and awards).
14. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (conceding that compulsory arbitration is only
suitable for a "range" of boundary disputes); see also Paulsson, supra note 1, at 126
(noting that effective settlement of boundary disputes requires more than a
systematic application of uniform principles to fact-intensive disputes).
15. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C (arguing that compulsory arbitration
will not effectively or efficiently resolve the Aves Island dispute because it
undermines the state sovereignty of Venezuela and Dominica, results in settlement
noncompliance and ineffective enforcement, and eliminates dispute settlement's
inherent efficiencies); cf Copeland, supra note 13, at 3107 (1999) (positing that a
uniform method of dispute resolution is not appropriate to resolve every boundary
dispute).
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over the Island.16 Part I also highlights arbitration and mediation
as internationally accepted means of dispute resolution and dis-
cusses the use of arbitration in Case Concerning East Timor ("Por-
tugal v. Australia")7 and Case Concerning Land and Maritime
Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria ("Cameroon v.
Nigeria"). 5
Part II argues against a U.N. compulsory arbitration require-
ment by first discussing its inconsistency with the sovereignty of
Venezuela and Dominica in light of Portugal v. Australia.9 Part
II next discusses Cameroon v. Nigeria to demonstrate that com-
pulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review will not effectively
resolve the Aves Island dispute. Compulsory arbitration is not
effective because the I.C.J. is unable to enforce decisions where
states such as Venezuela and Dominica fail to consent to arbitra-
tion or then comply with arbitral awards.2 ° Part II then illustrates
how compulsory arbitration decreases the efficiency of interna-
tional dispute resolution in light of Cameroon v. Nigeria.2
Part III recommends that the U.N., rather than implement
compulsory, standardized arbitration, should provide a forum in
which states may engage in a combination of mediation and arbi-
tration ("Med-Arb") to resolve boundary disputes.2 This section
16. See discussion infra Part L.A (explaining that Venezuela bases its claim to
Aves Island on historic title whereas Dominica bases its claim to the Island on its
geographic relation to Dominica's coastal baselines).
17. See generally East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30) (ruling on
the dispute between Portugal and Australia over the administrative control of East
Timor).
18. See generally Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10) (ruling on
Cameroon and Nigeria's competing claims of sovereignty to the Bakassi Peninsula
and Lake Chad).
19. See discussion infra Part II.A (claiming compulsory arbitration will undermine
the sovereignty of Venezuela and Dominica by violating their sovereign equality,
right to consent to the resolution of their dispute, and self-determination).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B (asserting that disputing states such as
Venezuela and Dominica are unlikely to recognize and comply with an award
resulting from compulsory arbitration where they do not consent initially to the
resolution of the dispute and discussing how their noncompliance will lead to
enforcement incapability).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C (arguing compulsory arbitration will reduce the
inherent efficiencies of dispute resolution by eliminating the opportunity for disputing
states such as Venezuela and Dominica to resolve their dispute through bilateral
negotiations or regional settlement mechanisms).
22. See discussion infra Part III (suggesting that Venezuela and Dominica should
engage in a combination of mediation and arbitration ("Med-Arb") to resolve their
dispute over Ayes Island because it will allow them to make their settlement process
more effective and efficient).
2006] SOVEREIGNTY OF AVES ISLAND 191
recommends that Venezuela and Dominica, similar to the parties
in International Business Machines, Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd. ("I.B.M.
v. Fujitsu"), engage in Med-Arb to capitalize on its advantages in
resolving their dispute over the sovereignty of Aves Island. Part
IV concludes that states should engage in Med-Arb in interna-
tional boundary disputes to achieve effective redress in the
future.24
II. BACKGROUND
Aves Island, located approximately 380 nautical miles ("nm")
north of Venezuela and 140 nm west of Dominica," is famous for
its spectacular birds and endangered sea turtles." More impor-
tantly, Aves Island's surrounding maritime territory contains a
significant amount of natural resources,27 which Venezuela claims
both sovereignty of 2" and the right to transport through the Carib-
23. See Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 13T-117-
0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.) (ruling on a commercial arbitration dispute
between I.B.M. and Fujitsu, in which Jones and Mnookin discussed the advantages of
using Med-Arb to resolve disputes in making their arbitral award); see also James T.
Peter, Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83, 83-84 (1997)
(asserting that Med-Arb is a desirable dispute settlement mechanism for
international disputes).
24. See discussion infra Part IV (concluding that states which employ Med-Arb to
resolve their disputes may obtain effective and efficient redress of their dispute while
contributing to international peace and security).
25. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (indicating that Aves Island is a small, remote
island of 1,900 feet in length and 1,640 feet in width).
26. See id. (noting that Aves Island is a breeding and resting place for many
different species of birds and green sea turtles and noting that Venezuela allows
scientists to visit Aves Island to study its exotic birds and sea turtles).
27. See Judy Maksoud, Global E&P Briefs: Americas, OFFSHORE, Oct. 2002, at 12
(reporting that the seabed of the Caribbean Sea contains approximately seventy
trillion cubic feet ("t.c.f.") of natural gas and reporting that control of the natural gas
located in the disputed maritime territory has significant economic implications
because it represents approximately 1.2% of the world's remaining natural gas
reserves); Energy Information Administration, Energy Outlook 2006, Report DOE/
EIA-0484 (June 2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/nat-gas.html
(estimating worldwide reserves of natural gas to be 6,112 t.c.f. in 2006).
28. By claiming sovereignty of Aves Island, Venezuela also claims sovereignty
over the Island's surrounding maritime territory and the natural resources located
therein. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
arts. 3, 57, 76, para. 5 (Dec. 10, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclos-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCLOSI (vesting
states that have ratified UNCLOS with a right to exercise sovereignty over the
maritime territory within 12 am of territorial seas, 200 nm of an exclusive economic
zone ("EEZ"), and 150 nm of a continental shelf); see also id. arts. 3, 56, para. 1, art.
77, para. 1 (stating sovereignty of such maritime territory encompasses the exclusive
right to explore and exploit resources located therein); Olson, supra note 8
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bean Sea.29 Dominica and various Caribbean states, however,
object"° to Venezuela's recent increased assertion of authority over
the Island.3 Though Venezuela and Dominica recently organized
talks amongst Caribbean foreign ministers to resolve their bound-
ary dispute, 32 Dominica may seek resolution of the long-standing
dispute through formal dispute resolution mechanisms in the near
future.
To prevent states such as Venezuela and Dominica from
resorting to force to settle their dispute, the U.N. offers diplomatic
and adjudicative means of dispute resolution that states may
employ to peacefully resolve such disputes.34 Portugal v. Australia
demonstrates that dispute settlement requires state consent.3 5
Cameroon v. Nigeria highlights the inefficacy of dispute settle-
ment where non-consenting states fail to recognize and comply
with settlement awards. 6 Finally, I.B.M. v. Fujitsu indicates that
(confirming that Venezuela claims sovereignty of natural resources located in the
disputed maritime territory in the Caribbean Sea).
29. See Newsletter: Trinidad and Tobago, OIL & GAS JoURNAL, Oct. 6, 2003, at 8
(describing Venezuela's intent to construct a liquid natural gas pipeline in the
Caribbean Sea which would supply natural gas to seven Caribbean states and
potentially the United States as well); see also Maksoud, supra note 27 (reporting that
Venezuela plans to complete its liquid natural gas pipeline in 2007).
30. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (voicing the objections of Caribbean states against
Venezuela's claim of sovereignty to Aves Island, the Prime Minister of St. Vincent
Ralph Gonsalves stated that "[iut [Aves Island] certainly is Dominica's as far as we are
concerned.").
31. See id. (reporting that Venezuela recently positioned seventeen sailors on a
newly established base on Aves Island). Commenting on Venezuela's recent action
with regard to Aves Island, Venezuelan Commander Guillermo Isturiz asserted that
"Aves Island belongs to Venezuela. Several nations in the Eastern Caribbean dispute
that claim, but we are reaffirming our sovereignty here." Id.
32. See Caribbean Community to Hold Talks, supra note 7 (reporting the talks will
center on the classification of Aves Island as an island versus a sandbar).
33. See Bert Wilkinson, Caribbean Countries May Ask U.N. to Settle Island
Dispute with Venezuela Over Waters Around Remote Island, ASSOCIATED PRESS
WORLDSTREAM, Nov. 7, 2005 (reporting that Caribbean countries may request the
U.N. to resolve the dispute over the sovereignty of Aves Island).
34. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (enumerating eight acceptable methods of
peaceful dispute settlement that states should first use to resolve their disputes). The
U.N. Security Council may intervene in disputes and require states to engage in
peaceful dispute settlement when necessary. Id. para. 2.
35. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (June 30) (failing to
rule on the dispute between Portugal and Australia where the dispute implicated
Indonesia's rights and obligations and where Indonesia did not consent to the dispute
as an interested state).
36. See Paul Burkhardt, Nigeria and Cameroon Reach Agreement Over Border
Disputes in Oil-rich Peninsula, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 12, 2006 (indicating that
Nigeria did not initially comply with the I.C.J.'s 2002 decision which required it to
pull troops out of the Bakassi Peninsula), available at http://africa.ibtimes.com/
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consensual dispute resolution allows parties to capitalize on the
advantages of both mediation and arbitration, and thereby
increase the efficacy and efficiency of their dispute settlement
process.37
A. Venezuela and Dominica Have Conflicting Claims
of Sovereignty of Aves Island and the Resources
Located in its Surrounding Maritime Territory
1. Venezuela Claims Sovereignty of Aves Island Based on
Historic Title
Venezuela claims that its historic title and sovereignty of
Aves Island dates to the nineteenth century.38 Although other
states have claimed sovereignty of Aves Island,39 Venezuela has
consistently exercised authority over the Island during the end of
the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries.40 Vene-
zuela also claims sovereignty of the maritime territory surround-
ing Aves Island, which extends into the maritime territory of
several other Caribbean states.41 While Venezuela has not yet
articles/20060613/nigeria-039-s-withdrawal-of-roops-from-oil-rich-peninsula.
Approximately four years after the I.C.J.'s ruling, "Nigeria has [finally] agreed to
withdraw troops from the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula." Id.
37. See Peter, supra note 23, at 83-85 (suggesting that states which engage in
Med-Arb may benefit from the advantages of both mediation and arbitration when
resolving their disputes).
38. See GORDON IRELAND, BOUNDARIES, POSSESSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN SOUTH
AMERICA 248 (1938) (indicating Venezuela claims that it obtained sovereignty of Aves
Island in 1865, when Queen Isabella II of Spain awarded Venezuela title to the Island
after Spain's dispute with the Netherlands); see also L. Benjamin Ederington,
Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from Sovereignty in
International Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 263, 289 (1997) (suggesting that Venezuela
claimed sovereignty of Aves Island in 1854, the year in which a dispute over the
"discovery of guano deposits on the Aves Islands" ensued between the United States
and Venezuela and suggesting that historic title is a valid and enforceable claim of
sovereignty against all states).
39. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (noting "Britain, Spain, the United States, the
Netherlands, and now Venezuela" have all claimed sovereignty over Aves Island).
40. See id. (reporting that Venezuela has demonstrated its sovereignty of Aves
Island by recently setting up military outposts and conducting weddings and
baptisms on the Island and specifying that even Venezuela "set up a scientific naval
base on [Aves Island] in 1978").
41. See id. (indicating that Venezuela's claim of sovereignty to Aves Island and its
surrounding maritime territory "would encompass Montserrat and Grenada"); see
also VICTOR PRESCO"r AND CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES
OF THE WORLD 358 (2005) (noting the maritime boundary between Aves Island and
Montserrat is measured by a line 32 nm equidistant from both states); id. at 362
(implying that Grenada is located approximately 51 nm from Aves Island, which
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ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"),42
Venezuela's claim to Aves Island would grant it rights to the
Island's territorial waters, exclusive economic zone ("EEZ"), and
continental shelf if it ratified UNCLOS.43
2. Dominica Claims Sovereignty of Aves Island Because it
Lies Within Dominica's Exclusive Economic Zone
In contrast, Dominica and various Caribbean states claim
that Dominica has sovereignty of Aves Island under the provisions
of UNCLOS and object to Venezuela's increasing show of author-
ity over the Island. 4' Both Dominica and other Caribbean states
claim that Aves Island is merely an uninhabited sandbar 45 and
therefore not entitled to its own territorial sea, EEZ, and conti-
nental shelf under UNCLOS. 4s Dominica, specifically, claims that
Aves Island, located only 140 nm west of Dominica's coastal base-
lines, falls within its EEZ under UNCLOS.47 Dominica also
serves as the point of equidistance that delimits Grenada's maritime boundaries with
other Caribbean states).
42. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the
Law of the Sea, 2-3, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.56 (Nov. 29,
2005) [hereinafter 2005 Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea], available at http:/
daccessdds.un.orgdocUNDOCGEN/N5/620!82/PDF/N0562082.pdf (reporting that
the provisions of UNCLOS are inapplicable to Venezuela because it is not party to
UNCLOS and stating the reasons for which Venezuela has not yet ratified UNCLOS
still persist).
43. See UNCLOS, supra note 28, art. 121 (providing that an island, defined as a
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, [and] above water at high tide,"
exercises rights to a territorial sea, EEZ, and a continental shelf).
44. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (indicating Dominica's claim of sovereignty to
Aves Island is based on the Island's closer proximity to Dominica than to Venezuela,
which is located approximately 380 nm south of Aves Island).
45. See Caribbean Community to Hold Talks, supra note 7 (presenting the
argument of Dominica and other Caribbean states that "Aves is not a true island but
rather a sandbar, and that therefore Dominica has more of a claim to waters off the
island.").
46. See id. (stating that Dominica, in essence, claims that the Aves Island is
incapable of sustaining human habitation and thus, similar to a rock, merits no EEZ
or continental shelf under UNCLOS Article 121); cf UNCLOS, supra note 28, art.
121, para. 3 ("[R]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.").
47. Dominica is entitled to an EEZ because it is party to UNCLOS. See The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea,
101 n.2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/429 (Sept. 30, 1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea], available at http:/
daccessdds.un.org/doc/LUNDOC/GEN/N99/283/83/PDF/N9928383.pdf (reporting that
Dominica has both signed and ratified UNCLOS); see also Oceans and Law of the Sea:
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of the
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related
Agreements as at 14 Sept. 2006, available at http://www.un.orgdepts/los/
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objects to Venezuela's claim of sovereignty of the maritime terri-
tory that surrounds Aves Island because it apportions significant
maritime territory away from Dominica and other Caribbean
states."
B. Venezuela and Dominica May Resolve Their
Dispute over the Sovereignty of Ayes Island
Through Internationally Accepted Means of
Dispute Resolution
Engaging in a means of dispute resolution may enable Vene-
zuela and Dominica to settle their dispute over Aves Island with-
out employing force.49 Engaging in such peaceful measures is, in
fact, an obligation imposed on U.N. Member States when resolv-
ing their boundary disputes." For example, the U.N. Charter
identifies eight acceptable methods of dispute resolution that are
either adjudicative or diplomatic in nature. 1 Whether states
engage in adjudicative or diplomatic means to resolve their dis-
putes,52 such mechanisms require the consent of sovereign states
for dispute settlement.53
reference files/chronological lists-of ratifications.htm (conveying that Dominica
became party to UNCLOS when it ratified its provisions on Oct. 24, 1991).
48. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (noting that Venezuela's claim of sovereignty to
Aves Island encompasses the EEZs of Caribbean Islands Montserrat and Grenada).
49. See CASSESE, supra note 2, at 103 (conveying that in addition to the U.N.
Charter's espousal of peaceful dispute resolution, customary international law and
recent international cases support the use of dispute resolution mechanisms to
prevent states from resorting to force in their disputes).
50. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 (obliging all U.N. Member States to "settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered").
51. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (providing that states may employ
"negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort[ing] to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means" to resolve
their disputes); see also Peters, supra note 11, at 4 (differentiating adjudicative
measures of dispute resolution from diplomatic methods due to their different
standards and binding processes).
52. See Peters, supra note 11, at 4 (pointing out that negotiation, inquiry,
mediation and conciliation are diplomatic-political means which result in nonbinding
awards whereas arbitration and litigation are adjudicative in nature and result in
binding awards).
53. Ideally, parties will reach a consensual agreement resulting in an enforceable
award in both adjudicative and diplomatic dispute resolution mechanisms. See id. at
5-7.
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1. Arbitration as an Adjudicative Dispute Resolution
Mechanism
Adjudicative means of dispute resolution require governing
bodies to apply precedent and customary international law to
resolve disputes between states.54 States that employ adjudicative
means of dispute resolution may elect formal in-court adjudication
or arbitration by temporary arbitral tribunals.5 States often pre-
fer to engage in international arbitration over adjudication when
resolving their disputes because arbitration ideally offers more
efficiency and expediency than that offered by adjudication.56
After states consent to arbitration,57 they compose a set of rules
and procedures for the arbitral tribunal to follow during arbitra-
tion.58 The tribunal then issues an award that is typically binding
on the disputing states.59
2. Mediation as a Diplomatic Dispute Resolution
Mechanism and Alternative to Arbitration
Mediation, a diplomatic method of dispute resolution, offers
states an opportunity to resolve their disputes through negotia-
tions mediated by a neutral third-party. ° States engage in diplo-
54. See id. (explaining that adjudicative methods of dispute resolution include
formal court adjudication and arbitration by arbitral tribunals).
55. See id. at 7 (commenting that arbitration is different from adjudication
because it offers a more flexible settlement procedure and allows parties to retain
more autonomy than does adjudication); see also BARRY E. CARTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 284 (4th ed. 2003) (describing the development of adjudicative
methods of dispute resolution where the Permanent Court of International Justice
("P.C.I.J.") and its successor, the I.C.J., are the principle international courts to which
states have submitted their disputes for adjudication in the twentieth century). The
I.C.J. replaced the P.C.I.J. because it became increasingly unable to enforce its
decisions. Id.
56. See Peter, supra note 23, at 87 (explicating that arbitration may be better
suited for certain international disputes because it "avoids the pitfalls of litigation"
whereby states engage in arbitration over adjudication because it offers a neutral
forum for dispute resolution, surer enforcement mechanisms, confidential procedures,
expert arbiters, and limited discovery).
57. See id. (asserting that states' consent to arbitration is imperative to the
enforceability of an award).
58. See THE ARBITRATOR'S HANDBOOK: A PRACTICE GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ch. 2, para. 2.1 (1998) ("[A]n important aspect of any
agreement to arbitrate is the written understanding of the parties as to what the
scope of the arbiter's authority and jurisdiction will be.").
59. See Lucy V. Katz, Arbitration as a Bridge to Global Markets in Transitional
Economies: The Republic of Cuba, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIsp. RESOL. 109, 138
(2005) (conveying that arbitral awards are similar to binding court orders or even
final judgments).
60. See Carlos De Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: 'Med-Arb' and the Confluence of
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matic means of dispute resolution, mediation in particular, to
reconcile their interests and reach a consensual agreement.61
Mediation is an advantageous method of dispute resolution
because it grants states significant autonomy and flexibility dur-
62 iing the resolution process, results in an impartial award by
third-party mediators, 3 and is typically even more efficient than
arbitration due to resource conservation 4
C. Portugal's Dispute with Australia over East Timor
Demonstrates that Dispute Settlement Requires
State Consent
1. Framing Portugal's and Australia's Historical Claims
of Sovereignty of East Timor
Although the Democratic Republic of East Timor is now inde-
pendent,65 its sovereignty has been in contention since the six-
teenth century.66 Portugal and Holland exercised sovereignty over
East and West Timor, respectively, between the sixteenth and
Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in
China, 18 COLUM. J. AsiAN L. 149, 152 (2004) (noting that neutral mediators first
"listen to an outline of the dispute and then meet each party separately to try to
moderate their respective positions").
61. See Peter, supra note 23, at 83 (proposing that states which engage in
voluntary mediation increase the likelihood that they reach a mutually beneficial
agreement).
62. See CARTER, supra note 55, at 276 (conveying that mediation allows parties to
retain control over the dispute and set mediation's procedures).
63. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 152 (indicating that when parties fail to reach
an agreement through negotiations, disinterested, third-party mediators may
facilitate dispute settlement by helping parties to focus more on aligning their
interests and less on their entitlements).
64. See id. at 153 (observing that mediation is more efficient "in terms of time and
money" than is arbitration).
65. See Herbert D. Bowman, Letting the Big Fish Get Away: The United Nations
Justice Effort in East Timor, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 371, 376-77 (2004) (noting that
the East Timorese passed a U.N. referendum on September 5, 1999, which recognized
East Timor as an independent state, no longer under the control of Indonesia's
military or militia). East Timor encompasses "the eastern part of the island of
Timor[,] which includes the island of Atauro, 25 kilometers to the north, the islet of
Jaco to the east, and the enclave of Oe-Cuesse in the western part of the island of
Timor." East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 11 (June 30). The southern
coast of East Timor is opposite the northern coast of Australia, which is located
approximately 430 kilometers south of East Timor. Id.
66. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 11 (June 30) (reporting
Portugal first colonized and claimed sovereignty of East Timor in the sixteenth
century whereas "[t]he western part of the island came under Dutch rule and later
became part of independent Indonesia").
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twentieth centuries." In 1949, however, Indonesia decolonized
from Holland and subsequently annexed West Timor.68 Indonesia
then invaded East Timor in 1974, unilaterally annexing it as a
province of Indonesia.69
Immediately thereafter, the U.N. Security Council issued two
resolutions that recognized East Timor as a sovereign state and
declared Portugal the temporary "administering power" of the
State.7 ° In 1991, a dispute between Portugal and Australia arose
when Portugal alleged that Australia engaged in actions that
failed to respect Portugal as East Timor's continuing, administer-
ing power.71 Australia, in contrast, contended that the East
Timorese granted it international responsibility for Timor.72
2. Portugal v. Australia Implicates a Third State That
Did Not Consent to Adjudication by the I.C.J.
Portugal initiated formal proceedings against Australia in
67. See Bowman, supra note 65, at 373-74. Portugal colonized East Timor in 1513
and the Dutch colonized the western part of Timor by the middle of the eighteenth
century. Id. In 1913, the countries ratified a border agreement which divided East
and West Timor. Id. Then, after "the Dutch granted Indonesia its independence in
1949, West Timor became part of the Indonesian Republic while East Timor remained
a Portuguese colony." Id. Japan's invasion of East Timor in 1941 resulted in more
recent conflicts between the Dutch, Australians and Japanese over the control of
Timor. Id.
68. See id. at 374 (stating that Portugal continued to exercise sovereignty over
East Timor during Indonesia's decolonization from Holland).
69. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 13 (June 30) (indicating
that since "Indonesia intervened in East Timor" in 1975, Indonesia occupied and
effectively controlled East Timor thereafter). Portugal withdrew from East Timor
altogether on December 8, 1975, leaving East Timor to Indonesia's sole control. Id.
East Timor became "an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia" when "Indonesia
enacted a law incorporating [East Timor] as part of its national territory." Id.
70. See id. paras. 14-15 (noting the U.N. Security Council issued two general
resolutions on December 22, 1975, and April 22, 1976, which demanded that
Indonesia "withdraw without delay all of its forces from [East Timor]" and recognize
the self-determination of its citizens). The U.N. Security Council requested Portugal
"to co-operate fully with the U.N. so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise
freely their right to self-determination." Id. para. 15.
71. See id. para. 1 (alleging that Australia failed to recognize the right of the East
Timorese to self-determination); see also Bowman, supra note 65, at 377 ("[Oln
September 20, 1999, a military force, spearheaded by Australian soldiers and labeled
the International Force [of] East Timor ("INTERFET"), landed at Dili, East Timor's
capital city. By the end of October, INTERFET had secured the bulk of the half-
island, thereby putting the United Nations in effective possession of the country.").
72. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 1 (June 30) (indicating
that Australia claimed Portugal deemed Australia internationally responsible for
East Timor as well); see also id. para. 18 (noting that Australia acted upon this
authority and established a "zone of cooperation" with Indonesia regarding joint
exploration of resources in East Timor).
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1995 because Australia failed to recognize Portugal's role as
administrator of East Timor, and because Australia acted con-
trary to the self-determination of the East Timorese.3 Both
States consented to arbitration by the I.C.J.,74 but thereafter Aus-
tralia objected to arbitration without Indonesia's consent as an
interested third-party.75 The I.C.J. noted that Indonesia was an
interested third-party in the dispute between Portugal and Aus-
tralia because its actions with regard to East Timor directly influ-
enced the Court's determination of whether Australia acted
lawfully.76 Because Indonesia did not consent to arbitration, the
I.C.J. lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, which prohibited the
I.C.J. from ruling without undermining Indonesia's sovereign
right to consent to arbitration.77
73. See id. (presenting Portugal's official claim that Australia's conduct
demonstrated it "failed to observe ... the obligation to respect the duties and powers
of [Portugal as] the administering Power [of East Timor] ... and ... the right of the
people of East Timor to self-determination and the related rights"). Resolution 384 of
the U.N. Security Council "called upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of
East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination." Id.
para. 15. However, Australia signed a treaty with Indonesia in 1989, which
established a "provisional arrangement for the joint exploration and exploitation of
the resources of an area of the continental shelf." Id. para. 18. Portugal claimed this
treaty violated Portugal's role as the administrative Power and the self-determination
of the East Timorese as it denied the East Timorese their right to exercise sovereignty
over natural resources located in the disputed maritime territory. Id. para. 19.
74. See id. para. 1 (noting the I.C.J. entertained jurisdiction over the dispute
because Portugal and Australia accepted compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 of
its statute); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 2, Oct.
24, 1945, 832 U.S.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute] (proclaiming that the I.C.J.
may exercise compulsory jurisdiction, ipso facto, over consenting states with regard to
matters of treaty interpretation, international law questions, disputes with regard to
breaches of international obligations, and reparation thereto).
75. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 21 (June 30) (contending
that there was no dispute between Australia and Portugal, but rather a dispute which
centered on the "question of the lawfulness of Australia's conduct" with respect to
Indonesia).
76. See id. para. 25 (concluding that the I.C.J. must consider the legality of
Australia's 1989 Treaty with Indonesia because its subject matter pertained to
Portugal's dispute with Australia).
77. See id. para. 34 (emphasizing that the I.C.J. did not rule on Portugal's claim
against Australia without the consent of Indonesia because it would have violated the
"well-established principle . . . that the [I.C.J.] can only exercise jurisdiction over a
state with its consent").
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D. Nigeria Fails to Comply with the Decision of the
L C.J. in Cameroon v. Nigeria
1. Framing Cameroon's Dispute over the Bakassi
Peninsula with Nigeria
Cameroon's border dispute with Nigeria, which centered on
the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula and maritime territory
surrounding Lake Chad, s stemmed from the ambiguous demarca-
tion of German territory in Western Africa after World War I.19 In
1964, the states bordering Lake Chad established the Lake Chad
Basin Commission to resolve local border disputes."0 Cameroon
bypassed the Commission, however, when it submitted its dispute
over the sovereignty of Bakassi Peninsula to the I.C.J. for binding
demarcation and delimitation of the maritime area surrounding
Lake Chad.8 '
2. The I.C.J. is Unable to Effectively Enforce its Award in
Cameroon v. Nigeria
Cameroon submitted its boundary dispute with Nigeria to the
I.C.J. for binding adjudication in 1994.82 Both Cameroon and
Nigeria claimed that they inherited title to the Bakassi Peninsula
through the concept of uti possidetis juris when they became inde-
pendent states. Under this concept, disputing states inherit
their respective colonial borders when they become independent. 4
78. See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94, para. 3 (Oct. 10) (implying Cameroon and Nigeria dispute the
sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula because they seek access to its vast oil reserves).
79. See id. para. 35 (discussing how after World War II, France and Britain
apportioned German territory that encompassed the disputed Bakassi Peninsula).
80. See id. para. 36 (noting the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which performs
dispute settlement functions pursuant to Article IX of its Statute, has regularly met
to discuss and resolve local border disputes since its inception).
81. See id. para. 1 (indicating that Cameroon submitted its dispute with Nigeria to
the I.C.J. because their bilateral negotiations stagnated and noting that Cameroon
wished to avoid further strife with Nigeria).
82. See id. (including in its application that the dispute centered around the
"sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula"); see also Press Release, I.C.J., Land and
Mar. Boundary Between Cameroon and Nig. (Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea
Intervening) (Oct. 10, 2002), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscomlipress2002/
ipresscom2002-26 cn 20021010.htm (pointing out that Cameroon also objected to
military troops that Nigeria positioned within the Bakassi Peninsula).
83. See Land and Mar. Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94, para. 26 (Oct. 10) (summarizing Cameroon's main contention
that Nigeria violated uti possidetis juris by failing to respect the boundary
demarcated by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1913).
84. See Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of
New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 590 (1996) (""U]ti possidetis provides that states
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In its 2002 decision, the I.C.J. granted Cameroon sovereignty of
Bakassi Peninsula and required Nigeria to withdraw its adminis-
trative and military forces located in the region. 5 Although the
award was binding, Nigeria did not initially recognize the decision
as legitimate and has only recently agreed to comply with the
I.C.J.'s order to withdraw from the Bakassi Peninsula.8 6
E. I.B.M. and Fujitsu Used a Combination of
Mediation and Arbitration to Resolve Their
Landmark Dispute
In I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, a landmark copyright infringement case,
I.B.M. and Fujitsu engaged in a combination of mediation and
arbitration to resolve their dispute.87 Employing Med-Arb allowed
the arbiters to capitalize on the advantages of both mediation and
arbitration and facilitate an efficient settlement process.8 8 Med-
Arb consists of two distinct stages. 9 First, mediators attempt to
facilitate agreement between the parties by directing negotia-
emerging from decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative
borders that they held at the time of independence."). States used the concept of uti
possidetis juris to form boundaries in Latin and South America in the 1800s. Id.
85. See Cameroon v. Nig., supra note 83, at paras. 225, 315 (granting the
sovereignty of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon based on the enforceability of the 1913
Anglo-German Agreement).
86. See Burkhardt, supra note 36 (reporting that the I.C.J. required Nigeria to
withdraw all of its soldiers by August, 2006, and reporting that Nigerian "troops [had]
a choice of being repatriated to Nigeria or remaining under the laws of Cameroon").
87. See generally Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 13T-
117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.) (recanting the dispute centered on
I.B.M.'s claim that Fujitsu misappropriated its operating system and accompanying
programs in order to develop and market I.B.M. compatible operating systems). But
see Anita Stork, The Use of Arbitration in Copyright Disputes: LB.M. v. Fujitsu, 3
HIGH TECH. L.J. 241, 243 (1988) (pointing out, however, that I.B.M. failed to register
its operating system for copyright protection). Fujitsu claimed that it did not
misappropriate I.B.M.'s operating system because the system, as the industry
standard, became accessible as public domain. Id..at 243-44.
88. See Peter, supra note 23, at 103 (noting that mediation facilitates a
subsequent, efficient arbitration by allowing the parties to establish a framework
agreement that resolves preliminary issues and defines settlement procedures); see
also Stork, supra note 87, at 250 (conveying that arbitration allows parties to
individually select third-party facilitators, tailor informal processes to their needs,
conduct private hearings, obtain faster resolution of their dispute, and reduce costs
during settlement).
89. See Peter, supra note 23, at 88-90 (suggesting that Med-Arb is most effect
when disputing parties first engage in mediation and then transition to arbitration).
But see De Vera, supra note 60, at 155-56 (noting that mediation may merge into
arbitration and that this merger, in turn, may cause the stages of Med-Arb to be less
distinct).
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tions.9° If disputing parties fail to reach an agreement through
mediation, the same third-party mediators then arbitrate the dis-
pute.91 In Med-Arb, the arbiters have traditional arbitral duties
and eventually issue a decision that has binding force on the
parties .92
III. ANALYSIS
The U.N. should not require arbitration of all boundary dis-
putes because it violates state sovereignty embodied in the U.N.
Charter.93 In addition, compulsory arbitration will not resolve
many boundary disputes effectively because it may result in set-
tlement noncompliance and creates unenforceable awards.94 Com-
pulsory arbitration also creates inefficiencies in dispute
settlement because it eliminates the opportunity for states such as
Venezuela and Dominica to resolve disputes through bilateral
negotiations or other regional settlement mechanisms.95
A. Requiring Venezuela and Dominica to Arbitrate
the Aves Island Dispute Violates State Sovereignty
Under the U.N. Charter
Compulsory, standardized arbitration subject to I.C.J. review
90. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 156 (stating that disputing parties may avoid
engaging in Med-Arb's arbitration phase when they reach a mutually beneficial
agreement in Med-Arb's mediation phase).
91. See Peter, supra note 23, at 90 (averring this role change equips third-party
facilitators with prior understanding of the parties' relationship and ultimate goals,
which results in a more efficient dispute resolution).
92. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 3, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force in the United States, Dec. 29, 1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201
et seq. (West 1999 & Supp. 2004)) [hereinafter New York Convention], available at
http://www.uncitral.orgpdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII-l-e.pdf (obliging
states party to the convention to recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
those awards where relied upon by disputing states); see also Peter, supra note 23, at
88-89 (observing that courts grant arbitral awards more deference than settlements
which are purely mediated and that parties may seek to enforce Med-Arb awards as
contracts or arbitral awards binding under the New York Convention).
93. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (arguing that compulsory arbitration violates
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter because it undermines the state sovereignty of
Venezuela and Dominica as U.N. Member States).
94. See discussion infra Part II.B (reasoning that compulsory arbitration will
result in settlement noncompliance by states that withhold initial consent to dispute
resolution and suggesting such noncompliance makes compulsory arbitration
innocuous due to weak international enforcement capabilities).
95. See discussion infra Part II.C (arguing that compulsory arbitration will
preclude Venezuela and Dominica from capitalizing on the efficiencies availed
through engaging in bilateral dispute resolution).
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would violate the state sovereignty of Venezuela and Dominica for
three reasons.96 First, compulsory arbitration violates Article 2 of
the U.N. Charter, which grants disputing states such as Vene-
zuela and Dominica sovereign equality.97 Second, Portugal v. Aus-
tralia demonstrates that the sovereignty of Venezuela and
Dominica encompasses the right to consent to the resolution of
their dispute over Aves Island, which compulsory arbitration
would dispense with.9" Third, compulsory arbitration is inconsis-
tent with the U.N.'s grant of self-determination to Member States
under Article 55, which implies Member States have the sovereign
right to choose a method of dispute resolution from a range of
internationally accepted means. 9
1. Compulsory Arbitration Violates the Sovereign
Equality of Venezuela and Dominica Under Article 2 of
the U.N. Charter
Implementing a requirement that states engage in arbitra-
tion directly conflicts with the right of sovereignty granted to
states under Article 2 of the U.N. Charter. °° Article 2, by grant-
ing sovereign equality to all U.N. Member States,1"' vests states
96. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (conceding that compulsory arbitration is
vulnerable to criticisms of violating state sovereignty).
97. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (noting the founders of the U.N. organized it
based on the "sovereign equality of all its Members").
98. See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (June 30)
(referencing the international standard that the I.C.J. cannot exercise jurisdiction
over states without their sovereign consent); Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 126 (Feb. 3) (emphasizing that
although states may imply consent to I.C.J. adjudication in certain circumstances, the
I.C.J.'s basis for entertaining jurisdiction must stem from state consent according to
its statute); Mar. Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16) (failing to rule on the dispute between Qatar
and Bahrain where Britain did not consent to I.C.J. adjudication and the dispute
affected Britain's interests); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (conveying that the necessity of
state consent to international adjudication predated the establishment of the I.C.J.).
99. See U.N. Charter art. 55 (basing the right to self-determination on the need for
peaceful and friendly relations between all states); cf id. art. 56 (obliging all U.N.
members to recognize the right of states to self-determination under Article 55).
100. See id. art. 2, para. 7 ("[N]othing... in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or . . . require [its] members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter."); see also id. arts. 1, 4 (inferring that
compulsory arbitration undermines the sovereign right of U.N. members, such as
Venezuela and Dominica, to their territorial and political independence).
101. See id. art. 2 (indicating that the U.N. is based on the sovereign equality of all
its members); id. art. 1 (proclaiming that states should cooperate to solve
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with the sovereign right to use, dispose of, and prevent unautho-
rized access to their territory by other states.10 2 Read broadly, this
sovereign right empowers states to act in manners reasonably
necessary to further state interests and interests of their
citizens. 03
Not surprisingly, the Aves Island dispute affects the state
sovereignty of both Venezuela and Dominica.14 Under the U.N.
Charter, Venezuela and Dominica obtained sovereign equality
under Article 2 when they became U.N. Member States.10 5 Sover-
eign equality encompasses the right to take action and protect
state interests and the best interests of the states' citizens.0 6
Compulsory arbitration denies Venezuela and Dominica the right
to political and economic independence0 7 because it restricts their
sovereign right to choose how to use, dispose of, and resolve dis-
putes over their territory.' 8 By denying Venezuela and Dominica
the right to act independently, and in the best interest of their
citizens, compulsory arbitration thus violates the state sover-
eignty of Venezuela and Dominica under Article 2 of the U.N.
international problems that are "economic, social, cultural, [and] humanitarian in
character"); see also CASSESE, supra note 2, at 88-91 (distinguishing states' sovereign
equality from legal equality and noting that sovereign equality serves as the basis for
international law).
102. See CASSESE, supra note 2, at 89-90 (noting that state sovereignty
encompasses the right to use and dispose of territory under the state's jurisdiction
and the right to exclude others from the state's territory).
103. See id. at 89 (observing that state sovereignty includes a state's right to
protect the best interests of its citizens and a duty to promote state security within its
territory).
104. See Maksoud, supra note 27 (implying that sovereignty of Ayes Island would
allow either Venezuela or Dominica to control the disputed maritime territory in the
Caribbean Sea and allow either state to transport a significant amount of natural gas
to various distribution points).
105. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (emphasizing that the U.N. is "based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"); see also Press Release, United
Nations Member States, U.N. Doc. ORG/1360/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 2004), available at http:l!
www.un.orglNews/Press/docs/20041ORG1360.rev.l.doc.htm (stating that Venezuela
and Dominica became U.N. Member States on Nov. 15, 1945, and Dec. 18, 1978,
respectively).
106. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (stating that U.N. Member States "shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity [and] political independence of any [Member] State").
107. See id. (mandating that no state may deprive U.N. Member States the right to
protect their state interests and those of their citizens).
108. Cf CASSESE, supra note 2, at 89-90 (mentioning that state sovereignty also
encompasses the right to exercise authority over individuals that live within a state's
territory, immunity for sovereign state actions in the jurisdiction of foreign courts,
and immunity for official actions performed by state representatives).
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2. Portugal v. Australia Demonstrates that Compulsory
Arbitration is Inconsistent with the Sovereignty of
Venezuela and Dominica Because it Dispenses with
Their Right to Consent to the Resolution of Their
Dispute
As signatories to the U.N. Charter, Venezuela and Dominica
have a sovereign right to consent to the settlement of the dispute
over Aves Island.1" 0 In Portugal v. Australia, for example, the
I.C.J. found that it could not decide a dispute that involved a non-
consenting third party."' In that case, the I.C.J. refused to rule on
Portugal's claims against Australia where it required ruling on
the conduct of Indonesia with respect to East Timor because Indo-
nesia did not consent to the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction." 2
Concerning the dispute over Aves Island, both Venezuela and
Dominica may assert the I.C.J.'s rationale in Portugal v. Australia
and argue that a requirement of compulsory arbitration will
undermine their sovereign right to consent to the resolution of the
Aves Island dispute."' Though neither Venezuela nor Dominica
has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J.,"I
mandatory arbitration would subject the Aves Island dispute to
review by the I.C.J., thereby undermining both States' right to
109. See U.N. Charter art. 2; CASSESE, supra note 2, at 89-90.
110. Cf. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (implying that all
interested states in a dispute must consent to dispute resolution before the I.C.J. can
review the dispute).
111. See id. (refusing to entertain jurisdiction over Portugal and Australia where
the I.C.J. needed to determine the lawfulness of Indonesia's actions without its
consent).
112. See id. (stating that because all of Portugal's claims centered on the same
question, "whether the power to make treaties concerning the continental shelf
resources of East Timor belong[ed] to Portugal or Indonesia," it was unnecessary for
the I.C.J. to consider Australia's claims as the I.C.J. could not rule without
Indonesia's consent as an interested third-party).
113. See id. at para. 24 (noting that the I.C.J. may not rule with regard to states'
international responsibility where the ruling affects the legal interests of the non-
consenting states and implying that even if Dominica seeks resolution of the Aves
Island dispute under I.C.J. review, Venezuela might argue that its legal interests in
Aves Island form the subject matter of the dispute, thereby precluding the I.C.J. from
mandating arbitration without its consent).
114. See I.C.J., Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the
Court (Feb. 16, 2006) [hereinafter I.C.J. Declarations], http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
ibasicdocuments/ibasictextibasicdeclarations.htm (indicating that Venezuela and
Dominica have not yet accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J.).
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consent to the resolution of their dispute.115 This argument is
especially persuasive in the case of Venezuela because it has not
yet ratified UNCLOS. 116 This demonstrates that Venezuela does
not intend to be bound by UNCLOS' arbitral provisions in its
international disputes."7 As such, compulsory arbitration would
violate the sovereign right of both Venezuela and Dominica to con-
sent to the resolution of their dispute over Aves Island." s
3. Compulsory Arbitration Violates Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter Which Grants Member States the Right to
Self-Determination
As U.N. Member States, both Venezuela and Dominica have
the right to self-determination under Article 55 of the U.N. Char-
ter.'19 This sovereign right to self-determination encompasses
political and economic independence. 20 Compulsory arbitration,
however, undermines the political and economic independence
2
1
of Venezuela and Dominica by denying them the ability to reject
consent to dispute resolution. 122 Compulsory arbitration, in effect,
denies Venezuela and Dominica the right to elect a course of
115. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (asserting compulsory arbitration should be
subject to procedural review by the I.C.J. due to the "limited" legal principles involved
in boundary disputes).
116. See 2005 Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea, supra note 42 (reporting that
Venezuela has not yet submitted to the compulsory provisions of UNCLOS, but it may
choose to ratify the Convention in the future, which would then make the provisions
of the Convention applicable to Venezuela).
117. Cf. UNCLOS, supra note 28, art. 287, para. 1 (declaring that states are free to
choose to accept the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
the I.C.J., or other special arbitral tribunals to resolve their territorial disputes when
signing or ratifying UNCLOS).
118. See id. (empowering states such as Venezuela and Dominica with the
sovereign right to choose to accept the compulsory jurisdiction provisions of
UNCLOS); see also I.C.J. Statute, supra note 74, art. 36 (granting states a sovereign
right to consent to the I.C.J.'s compulsory jurisdiction).
119. U.N. Charter art. 55 (indicating that state relations are based on respect for
peoples' self-determination and implying that peoples' self-determination is based in
the self-determination of states).
120. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to
Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (1998) (suggesting that states'
sovereign right to self-determination includes absolute independence of action; id. at
30-31 (implying that national self-determination, the "right of... nations to decide
their own destinies," fosters international peace and security).
121. See U.N. Charter art. 55 (highlighting that the right to self-determination
applies to "conditions of economic and social progress and development").
122. Cf. Orentlicher, supra note 120, at 37 (equating external interference with
states' sovereign actions concerning their territory with an "unequivocal denial of a
general right of national self-determination").
2006] SOVEREIGNTY OF AVES ISLAND 207
action which could better protect the stability of their economic
interstate relations, and respective state interests.
123
Applying Article 55 of the U.N. Charter to the Aves Island
dispute, Venezuela and Dominica may justifiably seek to exercise
their sovereign right to self-determination 124 when resolving this
dispute.'25  Self-determination is important for both States
because Aves Island may stimulate economic development and
provide Venezuela or Dominica with significant additional income
from tourism activities. 26 Self-determination becomes even more
critical where control of Aves Island's surrounding maritime terri-
tory and natural resources are at stake.'27 If Venezuela were to
ratify UNCLOS, then both Venezuela and Dominica might validly
claim the exclusive rights to explore and exploit the vast natural
gas reserves located within the EEZ and continental shelf sur-
rounding the Island. 28 Dominica, in particular, has a strong claim
to the sovereignty of Aves Island and its available natural
resources because should Aves Island be deemed a sandbar, it
123. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (Article 2 of the U.N. Charter requires U.N.
Member States to refrain from using force "against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the [U.N.]").
124. See id. art. 56 (noting that U.N. Member States should take action to further
their right to self-determination under Article 55).
125. Read broadly, Article 2 of the U.N. Charter protects against the interference of
states with the economic and political interests and autonomy of other Member
States. Id. art. 2.
126. See Alexander C. O'Neill, Note, What Globalization Means for Ecotourism:
Managing Globalization's Impacts on Ecotourism in Developing Countries, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 501, 527 (2002) (discussing tourism's stimulation of states'
economic development); see also Vaughan A. Lewis, The Interests of the Caribbean
Countries and the Law of the Sea Negotiations, in MARITIME ISSUES IN THE CARIBBEAN
1, 6 (Farrokh Jhabvala ed., 1983) (indicating that the Caribbean Sea bordering the
Venezuelan coastline has significant economic implications for Venezuela as
Venezuela's industrial centers of Caracas and Maracaibo (located on the coastline
facing the Caribbean Sea) serve as key export centers for oil and natural gas
products).
127. See UNCLOS, supra note 28, arts. 3, 57, 76 (providing that that sovereignty of
maritime territory would result in Member States' effective control of the territory's
seabed and subsoil located in its territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf).
128. See id. art. 56, para. 1 ("In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has
... sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the water, currents and winds. . . . "); id. art. 77, para. 1
(the coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring and exploiting its natural resources); see also Maksoud, supra note 27
(indicating that access to Caribbean maritime territory would result in rights to
explore and exploit approximately seventy t.c.f. of natural gas).
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would be located within Dominica's EEZ under UNCLOS Article
57.129 Furthermore, Venezuela's claim of sovereignty over Aves
Island may compromise Dominica's self-determination in political
and economic relations with its neighboring Caribbean states as
Venezuela's claim overlaps their EEZs as well. 130 Because both
States have significant interests in Aves Island and the natural
resources located in its surrounding maritime territory, compul-
sory arbitration would violate their sovereign right to resolve the
dispute in a manner that best protects their state interests and
those of their citizens.'
4. Self-Determination Grants Venezuela and Dominica
the Right to Elect an Acceptable Means of Dispute
Settlement to Resolve the Aves Island Dispute
Venezuela and Dominica are entitled to self-determination
under Article 55 of the U.N. Charter. 132 This entitlement encom-
passes the sovereign right to select an acceptable method of dis-
pute resolution which best protects their state interests as
enumerated in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.'33 Applied to the
Aves Island dispute, Venezuela may seek to engage in mediation
with Dominica as the most effective method of dispute settlement
to conserve its resources.M As a larger, more economically power-
129. See UNCLOS, supra note 28, art. 57 (providing UNCLOS Member States with
an EEZ of 200 nm from their coastal baselines). But see Caribbean Community to
Hold Talks, supra note 7 (reporting that if Aves Island is determined to be a separate
island or rock capable of habitation, rather than a sandbar, the Island would be
entitled to an EEZ under UNCLOS); id. art. 121 (noting an Island's surrounding
maritime territory is delimited similar to the territorial sea, EEZ, and continental
shelf of other land territory). "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own[,] shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf." Id.
130. See Toothaker, supra note 6 (implying that Venezuela's claim of sovereignty
would not just encompass the Caribbean nations of Montserrat and Grenada, but
their territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves as well).
131. See CASSESE, supra note 2, at 89 (positing that self-determination obligates
states to take action in the best interest of their citizens).
132. See U.N. Charter art. 55 (vesting states with the right to self-determination,
"[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations").
133. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (arguing that self-determination vests U.N.
Member States with the right to independently elect a political or economic course of
action); see also U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (granting U.N. Member States the
"choice" to select and employ a means of dispute resolution from those enumerated
within the U.N. Charter); Vidmar, supra note 5, at 101 (conceding that party
autonomy and flexibility are integral to effective dispute settlement).
134. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (enumerating mediation as an acceptable
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ful state,13 Venezuela might apply political and economic pressure
to Dominica during bilateral negotiations where Venezuela could
not in the more formalized procedures of arbitration or adjudica-
tion.3 6 This, in turn, may coerce Dominica to premature or unnec-
essary compromise,"' thereby saving Venezuela the burden and
additional costs of formal arbitration or adjudication. 3 '
Dominica, in contrast, may prefer formal arbitration or adju-
dication to protect its interests in Aves Island and the natural
resources located in its surrounding maritime territory.39 Such
formal procedures may provide Dominica greater impartiality and
equality during dispute resolution. 140 In addition, because Domi-
nica is not as economically developed, it may want to stipulate
specific conditions and procedures of settlement, which compul-
sory arbitration may preclude.' Compulsory arbitration thus
denies Venezuela and Dominica an opportunity to select applica-
ble settlement procedures, which undermines dispute resolution's
intended flexibility and autonomy and violates their established
right to self-determination under Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.'
means of dispute resolution from which U.N. Member States may choose to employ
when resolving their disputes).
135. Compare THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 848 (William A.
McGeveran, Jr. et al. eds., 130th ed. 2006) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC] (reporting
that in 2004, Venezuela had a gross domestic product of $145.2 billion, which had
grown 16.8% from 2003), with id. at 773 (reporting that Dominica's GDP, last
estimated in 2003, was only approximately $384 million, a decrease of 1% from the
previous year).
136. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (stating that formal dispute resolution is less
important for larger, more powerful states because they may utilize their economic
resources to apply pressure to smaller and weaker nations).
137. See id. (suggesting that such "extra-legal, political and economic pressures"
would undermine the equality of the disputing states in the dispute resolution
process).
138. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 155 (associating formal adjudication or
arbitration with higher costs than those incurred during less formal means of dispute
resolution such as mediation); see also Peter, supra note 23, at 99-100 (emphasizing
that formal arbitration is "time-consuming and cost-intensive"); id. at 86-87
(attributing the costly procedures of international arbitration to the arbitral bodies'
required opinion).
139. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (noting "weaker" states are more likely to
obtain equality during dispute resolution in formal dispute resolution mechanisms).
140. See Peter, supra note 23, at 87 (conveying that impartial procedures and
arbiter neutrality are two main advantages of arbitration).
141. See id. at 84 (noting autonomy and flexibility of procedures are two main
advantages of mediation).
142. Compare U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (granting U.N. Member States
flexibility by allowing them to choose their preferred method of dispute settlement),
with East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (June 30) (emphasizing that
U.N. Member States have the right to consent to dispute resolution).
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B. Compulsory Arbitration Subject to I.C.J. Review is
Unlikely to Effectively Resolve the Ayes Island
Dispute Because the I.C.J. is Unable to Enforce
Decisions Against Non-Consenting States
A U.N. requirement that all states engage in compulsory,
standardized arbitration subject to I.C.J. review is unlikely to
effectively resolve the Aves Island dispute for two reasons.
143
First, Cameroon v. Nigeria demonstrates that disputing states
such as Venezuela and Dominica may not cooperate during settle-
ment or comply with an arbitral award where they do not origi-
nally consent to the resolution of their dispute.'" Second, although
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter affords Member States an opportu-
nity to seek enforcement through the U.N. Security Council,1
45
I.C.J. decisions are effectively unenforceable unless disputes rise
to a level that endangers international peace and security.
1 46
1. Compulsory Arbitration Reduces the Likelihood for
Compliance with an Arbitral Award if Either
Venezuela or Dominica Withhold Consent to the
Settlement of the Aves Island Dispute
Effective resolution of international boundary disputes
requires states such as Venezuela and Dominica to cooperate dur-
ing settlement.1 47 Articles 2 and 33 of the U.N. Charter obligate
U.N. Member States to attempt peaceful resolution of their dis-
putes in good faith.'48 The cooperation of Venezuela and Dominica
is especially important in resolving this dispute because it affects
143. See discussion infra Part II.B (arguing that compulsory arbitration will not
effectively resolve the dispute over Aves Island because it will encourage
noncompliance and result in an unenforceable award).
144. See discussion infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing why "losing" states are unlikely to
implement unfavorable judgments).
145. See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (providing that where "any party to a case
fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the
Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give
to the judgment").
146. See id. art. 39 (indicating that the U.N. Security Council will only make
recommendations as to potential courses of action where disputes threaten
international peace and security or constitute an act of aggression).
147. See Peters, supra note 11, at 2 (claiming the "Friendly Relations Doctrine"
imparts a general duty for all states to cooperate in their interstate relations).
148. Compare U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2 (explaining the duty of U.N. Member
States to comply with the provisions of the U.N. Charter in good faith), with id. art.
33, para. 1 (emphasizing U.N. Member States should attempt to engage in peaceful
dispute resolution through means enumerated in the U.N. Charter), and arts. 55-56
210
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the allocation of vast amounts of natural resources located in the
maritime territory within the Caribbean Sea.'49 Subjecting the
dispute to compulsory arbitration, however, incorrectly assumes
that Venezuela and Dominica will both consent to and cooperate
during dispute settlement, and then recognize and comply with
any resulting arbitral award. 150
In Cameroon v. Nigeria, Nigeria did not initially comply with
the I.C.J.'s award of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon because
Nigeria considered the decision of the I.C.J. invalid where Nigeria
withheld its consent to dispute settlement.15 While Nigeria
recently agreed to withdraw its troops from the disputed Bakassi
Peninsula, the U.N. has not enforced compliance with its resolu-
tion.'52 Similarly, Venezuela or Dominica may withhold consent to
the settlement of this dispute. 53 For example, Venezuela demon-
strated its lack of consent to be bound by compulsory dispute set-
tlement when it refused to ratify UNCLOS."' Should the I.C.J.
decide against Venezuela, it may oblige Venezuela to implement
(providing that states should attempt to maintain friendly relations with other states
as well).
149. See Energy Information Administration, supra note 27 (reporting that natural
gas reserves in Central and South America, estimated at 3.8 t.c.f. in 2003, are
projected to rise to 10.8 t.c.f. by 2030, and suggesting that control of such a natural
gas supply would grant both Venezuela or Dominica significant economic benefits as
"natural gas is the fastest growing fuel source" in the region); see also Olson, supra
note 8 (referencing "Guyana's mineral-rich Essequibo region and the northern Gulf of
Venezuela," bordering the maritime territory in dispute, as the main sources of such
potential revenue).
150. See Peters, supra note 11, at 7 (conveying that state cooperation stems from
initial consent to dispute resolution).
151. See Nejib Jebril, The Binding Dilemma: From Bakassi to Badme - Making
States Comply with Territorial Decisions of International Judicial Bodies, 19 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 633, 650-51 (attributing Nigeria's noncompliance with the I.C.J.'s grant
of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon to Nigeria's objection that it had not consented to
the jurisdiction of the I.C.J.); cf. id. at 636, 645 (suggesting that this case exemplifies
the I.C.J.'s inability to enforce decisions).
152. See Burkhardt, supra note 36 (stating that although its 2002 award of Bakassi
to Cameroon had "binding" effect, the U.N. has not taken measures to recommend or
enforce compliance with the award).
153. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (remarking that no method of dispute
resolution may prove effective where states are disinclined to cooperate); cf
Burkhardt, supra note 36 (noting that if it took the U.N. approximately four years
after issuing its 2002 "binding" award to compel Nigeria to withdraw its troops from
the disputed Bakassi Peninsula, then it is unlikely the U.N. would apply similar
pressure to the "losing state" in the Aves Island dispute because neither Venezuela
nor Dominica has taken military action with regard to the dispute or posed a similar
threat to international peace and security).
154. See 2005 Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea, supra note 42 (stating that
Venezuela has not signed, ratified, or acceded to the compulsory provisions of
UNCLOS).
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an unfavorable judgment similar to Nigeria in Cameroon v. Nige-
ria.155 Venezuela is unlikely to comply with an unfavorable deci-
sion where it specifically has not consented to dispute settlement
and therefore considers any resulting award illegitimate."' 6 Com-
pulsory arbitration is therefore unlikely to resolve Venezuela's
dispute with Dominica over Aves Island because either state may
withhold consent to dispute resolution and then ultimately fail to
comply with any arbitral award.157 In turn, as it did in the dispute
over Bakassi Peninsula, the U.N. may fail to enforce compliance
with a judgment where either Venezuela or Dominica fail to com-
ply with an unfavorable award.
2. The I.C.J. Effectively Lacks the Capability to Enforce
an Arbitral Award if Either Venezuela or Dominica
Fail to Comply with Arbitration
Compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review is unlikely to
resolve the Aves Island dispute because the I.C.J. lacks enforce-
ment capability over Venezuela and Dominica.15s Cameroon v.
Nigeria demonstrates that the I.C.J. is unable to enforce decisions
where states fail to comply with and recognize the legitimacy of
I.C.J. awards.159 Unlike Cameroon v. Nigeria, in which both states
previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J., Ven-
155. See Land and Mar. Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94, paras. 37-38 (Oct. 10) (granting sovereignty of the Bakassi
Peninsula to Cameroon); see also Jibril, supra note 151, at 635 ("[Nigeria] greeted the
[I.C.J.'s] ruling that the Bakassi Peninsula belonged to Cameroon with anger and
contempt.").
156. Compare Land and Mar. Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 94, para. 22 (June 11) (Preliminary Objections)
(suggesting that although Nigeria acknowledged that it had accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. under Article 36, Nigeria contended Cameroon failed to act in
good faith by "disregard[ing] the condition of reciprocity" under Article 36), and Jibril,
supra note 151, at 651 ("Nigeria called attention to the fact that it had objected to the
jurisdiction of the Court and had never agreed to be bound by the Court's decision."),
with Burkhardt, supra note 36 (reporting that Nigeria did not agree to comply with
the I.C.J.'s award of sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon until four
years after the I.C.J.'s award).
157. Cf Robert P. Burns, Symposium on Critical Issues in Mediation Legislation,
The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements: An Essay on Legitimation and Process
Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 93, 114-15 (1986) (suggesting that parties are
more likely to comply with awards where they previously agree to the enforceability of
the awards).
158. Cf Jibril, supra note 151, at 650-51 (commenting on international bodies' lack
of enforcement capability where states draft weak arbitration agreements).
159. See id. at 650-51 (emphasizing that the I.C.J. may not be able to enforce
decisions where disputing states claim the I.C.J. lacks original jurisdiction over the
dispute).
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ezuela and Dominica have not consented to the I.C.J.'s compulsory
jurisdiction. 6 ° Because the I.C.J. may only entertain disputes
where the states consent to its jurisdiction,16' compulsory arbitra-
tion will result in an award that lacks binding force on Venezuela
and Dominica.6 2 On the other hand, if both Venezuela and Domi-
nica accept the I.C.J.'s jurisdiction, then either State may seek
judicial enforcement of an arbitral decision under Article 94 of the
U.N. Charter.'63 However, enforcement appeals under Article 94
have shown to be futile. This is apparent in Cameroon v. Nigeria,
in which disputing states did not comply with the I.C.J. award,
but eventually established a bilateral settlement commission to
resolve their dispute."M
Furthermore, although Article 94 of the U.N. Charter empow-
ers the U.N. Security Council to intervene and enforce I.C.J. deci-
sions through economic and political sanctions,'65 the Security
Council is unlikely to intervene in the Aves Island dispute unless
the conflict rises to a level that endangers international peace and
security. 166 Even if the Security Council intervenes, Venezuela
160. See International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory
the Jurisdiction of the Court (Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter I.C.J. Declarations], http:/!
www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (reporting
that Venezuela and Dominica have not yet accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
I.C.J.).
161. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 74, art. 36 (providing methods through which
the I.C.J. may exercise jurisdiction over Member States); id. para. 1 (asserting that
states may accept the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. on an ad hoc basis through a bilateral
or multilateral treaty); id. para. 2 (providing that states may further accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. for all disputes).
162. Cf. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (June 30) (reiterating
that the I.C.J. may only hear and rule on cases in which states consent to its
jurisdiction).
163. See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 ("[Ilf any party to a case fails to perform the
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other
party may have recourse to the Security Council . . ").
164. See Burkhardt, supra note 36 (reporting that Cameroon and Nigeria have
finally agreed to resolve their dispute bilaterally and have also recently set up "an
international follow-up committee to monitor implementation made up of
representatives from Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as the U.S., Germany, France
and Britain"); see also id. (stating that a "[U.N.] entity known as the Cameroon-
Nigeria Mixed Commission" will monitor implementation and compliance by
Cameroon and Nigeria).
165. See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (empowering the U.N. Security Council to
"make recommendations or decide upon measures" that it should take to enforce
I.C.J. judgments). In addition, Article 94 expressly empowers the Security Council to
recommend action to resolve disputes. Id.
166. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (stating that a fundamental purpose of the
U.N. is to identify threats to international peace and security and take effective
measures to prevent and/or remove such threats). But see Jibril, supra note 151, at
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1
may withstand economic and political pressure because of its sta-
tus as an economically powerful state.'67 Although intervention by
the Security Council might affect Dominica should it be rendered
an unfavorable judgment, Dominica may also withstand economic
pressure by relying on resources from other states within the Car-
ibbean community.16 Because the U.N. Security Council's
enforcement capability will likely have limited effect on the Aves
Island dispute, compulsory arbitration is thus unlikely to effec-
tively resolve the dispute between Venezuela and Dominica.'69
C. Compulsory Arbitration Subject to I.C.J. Review
Creates Inefficiency for the I.C.J. and for
Disputing States Such as Venezuela and Dominica
Requiring states to engage in standardized arbitration subject
to I.C.J. review is an inefficient process of dispute resolution.'7 °
First, mandatory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review creates ineffi-
ciencies in the hierarchy of dispute resolution bodies set forth in
Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. 7' Second, Cameroon v. Nigeria
demonstrates that compulsory arbitration deprives disputing
states such as Venezuela and Dominica the efficiencies of engag-
ing in bilateral negotiations or regional dispute settlement
mechanisms. 172
659 (discussing the U.N. Security Council's hesitancy to intervene in disputes
between Member States).
167. See WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 135, at 140 (conveying that Venezuela alone
maintained crude oil and natural gas reserves of approximately six and two percent,
respectively, of world totals in 2004); see also id. (stating that Venezuela's 2004 crude
oil reserves were approximately four times that of entire Western Europe, while its
natural gas reserves were equated to those of Western Europe less reserves from the
United Kingdom).
168. Cf Myrtle D. Bishop and Samuel J. Chandler, Caribbean Perspective:
Opportunities and Challenges: The Caribbean Involvement in the Free Trade Area of
the Americas, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 909, 911-16 (2004) (emphasizing a major goal of
the Caribbean Single Market Economy is to increase intra-regional movement of
resources between Caribbean states).
169. See 2005 Report on Oceans and Law of the Sea, supra note 42, at 1-2
(presenting Venezuela's desire not to be bound by I.C.J. awards where it has not
consented to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J.).
170. See discussion infra Part II.C (arguing that compulsory arbitration creates
inefficiencies for both international dispute resolution bodies and disputing states
such as Venezuela and Dominica).
171. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (claiming that mandatory arbitration will
create inefficiency in the hierarchy of acceptable dispute resolution mechanisms
because it bypasses preliminary diplomatic dispute settlement procedures
enumerated in the U.N. Charter).
172. See discussion infra Part II.C.2 (discussing how compulsory arbitration denies
Venezuela and Dominica the benefits of local expertise, predictable and expedient
214
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1. Compulsory Arbitration Bypasses Preliminary
Diplomatic Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Embodied
in the U.N. Charter
Mandatory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review, though pro-
posed to make international dispute resolution more efficient,
may in fact decrease the efficiency of dispute settlement.17 In
Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. sets forth a hierarchy of
settlement methods from which states may choose to employ in
resolving their disputes.174 Initially setting forth negotiation,
mediation, and conciliation as acceptable means of dispute settle-
ment in Article 33, the U.N. Charter indicates that U.N. Member
States engaging in such preliminary bilateral procedures add to
the administrative efficiency of international dispute resolution.'75
I.C.J. review of compulsory arbitration, for instance, elimi-
nates the opportunity for Venezuela and Dominica to negotiate
bilaterally by mandating review of the Aves Island dispute before
the I.C.J."' Even if bilateral negotiations between Venezuela and
Dominica fail, compulsory arbitration will deprive them an oppor-
tunity to settle regionally before mechanisms such as the Perma-
nent Council of the Organization of the American States or other
arbitral tribunals with jurisdiction under Article 286 of
UNCLOS.'77 By eliminating these opportunities, compulsory arbi-
dispute resolution, and lower costs, all of which are available through bilateral or
other regional dispute settlement mechanisms).
173. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (implying resolution of disputes through
bilateral negotiations or regional settlement increases administrative efficiency by
reducing the number of disputes that U.N. Member States submit to the I.C.J. for
review).
174. See id. (suggesting that states should only resort to I.C.J. adjudication where
bilateral dispute resolution fails to resolve disputes).
175. See id. (noting that states may seek to resolve disputes through "regional
agencies or arrangements" as an acceptable means of dispute resolution as well); cf.
Land and Mar. Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998
I.C.J. 94, paras. 66-67 (June 11) (Preliminary Objections) (discussing how dispute
resolution through regional mechanisms such as the Lake Chad Commission may
increase dispute resolution's efficacy and efficiency where disputes involve facts
specific to certain regions).
176. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (suggesting states should be required to
bypass bilateral or regional settlement because territorial disputes are "governed only
by a few basic legal principles").
177. See Charter of the Organization of American States, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Dec. 13, 1951), amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, 721 U.N.T.S. 324
(entered into force Feb. 27, 1970), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
charter.html ("[The Permanent Council] shall assist the parties and recommend the
procedures it considers suitable for peaceful settlement of the dispute."); see also
UNCLOS, supra note 28, art. 286 (granting states party to UNCLOS the right to
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tration decreases the efficiency of the dispute resolution hierarchy
embodied in Article 33 by requiring all disputes be reviewed
before the I.C.J." s
2. Compulsory Arbitration Deprives Disputing States
Such as Venezuela and Dominica the Efficiencies of
Engaging in Bilateral Settlement Procedures
While decreasing the administrative efficiency of interna-
tional dispute resolution, compulsory, standardized arbitration
deprives disputing states such as Venezuela and Dominica the
efficiencies of bilateral settlement procedures as well." 9 Article 52
of the U.N. Charter encourages disputing states to engage first in
dispute settlement at regional levels because the U.N. recognizes
that certain disputes are most appropriately, and efficiently,
resolved in regional mechanisms.180 Additionally, in Cameroon v.
Nigeria, the I.C.J. noted that a regional agency, geared towards
the resolution of geographically specific disputes, is often the
appropriate settlement mechanism for territorial boundary dis-
putes.18 ' This emphasizes that regional settlement mechanisms
may offer Venezuela and Dominica efficiencies that standardized
adjudication or arbitration may lack.
182
For instance, regional settlement mechanisms may grant
Venezuela and Dominica access to the benefits of local expertise
with regard to regional law, customs, and agreements." 3 In addi-
submit their disputes for resolution to "[a]n arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII [or VIII] of the Convention").
178. See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (assuming that the I.C.J.'s review of all
territorial disputes adds effectiveness and efficiency to dispute resolution because all
territorial disputes involve the same principles). But see Paulsson, supra note 1, at
126 (noting that the application of uniform principles to disputes which involve
different, case-specific facts will not effectively resolve all boundary disputes).
179. See generally U.N. Charter arts. 52-54 (providing U.N. Member States the
opportunity to engage in dispute resolution within regional bodies).
180. See id., para. 2 (obliging U.N. members to attempt resolution of their disputes
through regional settlement mechanisms before submitting their disputes to the U.N.
for resolution).
181. See Land and Mar. Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 94, paras. 66-67 (June 11) (Preliminary Objections) (noting the Lake
Chad Commission, a regional settlement body, appropriately hears and decides issues
of international peace and security specific to its region).
182. See U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (emphasizing that certain disputes between
U.N. Member States are best resolved through regional mechanisms); id. para. 3
(noting the U.N. actually encourages dispute resolution through regional, or local,
settlement bodies).
183. See Raj Bhala & Lucienne Attard, Austin's Ghost and DSU Reform, 37 INT'L
LAw. 651, 656 (2003) (observing that disputing parties are often more comfortable
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tion, Venezuela and Dominica may elect to resolve their dispute
through a regional and permanent dispute settlement body's' in
order to add consistency and predictability to their award."8 5 Con-
sequently, mandatory arbitration will not only deprive Venezuela
and Dominica of the efficiencies of regional experts, consistent and
predictable awards, and potentially lower settlement costs, all of
which are available in regional mechanisms, but it will also dis-
courage compliance with awards where the I.C.J. lacks the local
expertise and credibility of regional settlement bodies.'86
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.N. may foster a more effective and efficient means of
dispute resolution than that offered by compulsory, standardized
arbitration by providing a forum for states to engage in Med-Arb
when resolving their disputes.87 Med-Arb is an effective means of
dispute resolution for disputing states such as Venezuela and
Dominica because it encourages state cooperation in dispute set-
tlement and compliance with settlement awards. 8' In addition,
Med-Arb adds efficiency to the dispute resolution process by pro-
viding states such as Venezuela and Dominica with the advan-
engaging in regional dispute settlement because regional mechanisms have panels
which "share a similar racial or ethnic lineage, historical experience, religious
tradition, legal culture, and/or language"). Arbitral panels with such similarities may
add efficiency to the dispute settlement process where they apply a "like-mindedness"
in resolving disputes. Id.
184. Cf Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
899, 924 (2005) (pointing out that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
heard thousands of cases and is experiencing successful compliance rates with its
awards). The Court is a permanent "quasi-judicial tribunal that reviews petitions,
interprets the human rights obligations of OAS Member States, issues
recommendations to those states, and submits cases to the court for a legally binding
ruling." Id.
185. See Bhala & Attard, supra note 183, at 658-59 (discussing how the application
of stare decisis by permanent dispute resolution bodies may increase the efficiency of
dispute resolution by expediting and adding predictability to the settlement process).
186. See id. at 656 (acknowledging that "regional adjudicating authority's decisions
are more likely to be well-received and accepted than the decisions of some central
'global' authority sitting in New York or Geneva, which has no connection or
proximity to the hotbed of the dispute").
187. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (asserting that Med-Arb is a more
effective and efficient method of dispute resolution for territorial boundary disputes
than is compulsory arbitration).
188. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (suggesting that states which engage in
Med-Arb to resolve their territorial boundary disputes are more likely to recognize
and comply with a mutually beneficial agreement).
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tages of both mediation and arbitration in their dispute
settlement.'89
A. Venezuela and Dominica Should Engage in Med-
Arb Because it Will Make Their Dispute Resolution
Process More Effective
By engaging in Med-Arb, Venezuela and Dominica will add
efficacy to their dispute resolution process and increase the likeli-
hood of settlement compliance. 190 First by providing for the sover-
eign right of Venezuela and Dominica to consent to resolution of
their dispute, Med-Arb will make the dispute resolution process
more effective by encouraging both states to cooperate and
attempt resolution of the Aves Island dispute in good faith. 191 Sec-
ond, because Med-Arb increases the likelihood that states will
reach a settlement, it will add efficacy to the resolution of the Aves
Island dispute by encouraging settlement compliance and curing
any potential enforcement issues with the resulting award.192
1. Med-Arb Will Increase the Effectiveness of Dispute
Settlement by Encouraging -Both Venezuela and
Dominica to Cooperate During Settlement and Make
Good-Faith Attempts at Dispute Resolution
Venezuela and Dominica may increase the efficacy of dispute
resolution process by employing Med-Arb in their settlement. 93
Med-Arb, unlike compulsory arbitration, is based upon the con-
sent of disputing parties to resolve their dispute.'94 The parties in
189. See discussion infra Part LII.B (proposing that Venezuela and Dominica may
capitalize on the flexibility and resource conservation offered by Med-Arb).
190. See David Freestone & John Pethick, Sea Level Rise and Maritime
Boundaries, in 5 WORLD BOUNDARIES 73 (Gerald H. Blake ed., 1994) (implying that
because agreements between disputing states which demark their maritime
boundaries are not subject to subsequent territorial changes, such agreements are
more likely to encourage effective dispute resolution); cf. Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp. v.
Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 13T-117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.)
(discussing how I.B.M. and Fujitsu made the resolution of their dispute more effective
by engaging in Med-Arb).
191. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (obliging U.N. Member States to attempt to
resolve their international disputes in good faith).
192. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 152 (implying disputing parties that reach
agreement through mediation are more likely to definitively resolve their dispute and
comply with the agreement).
193. Cf Peter, supra note 23, at 106-14 (discussing how China, Germany, and
Switzerland have used Med-Arb to effectively resolve their international disputes).
194. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 153 (observing the arbitration phase of Med-
Arb requires state consent for dispute settlement).
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I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, for example, established consent to the processes
of Med-Arb during their initial meetings.195 This consensus
allowed the parties to establish a framework agreement that
encompassed the development of settlement processes and party
obligations before, during, and after settlement.'96
Venezuela and Dominica should similarly engage in Med-Arb
when resolving the dispute over Aves Island. 97 Establishing a
framework agreement that defines the development of a settle-
ment and its processes will offer clarity and guidance to both Ven-
ezuela and Dominica with regard to their agreed obligations
during settlement and enforcement.'98 More importantly, Vene-
zuela and Dominica are more likely to cooperate with procedures
and honor obligations that they initially agree upon in such a
framework agreement.'99
2. Med-Arb Encourages Compliance with Settlement and
Cures Enforcement Issues
Med-Arb may also add efficacy to the settlement of the Aves
Island dispute because it encourages compliance with awards. °°
As demonstrated by I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, parties are more likely to
recognize and comply with Med-Arb awards because they stem
from consensual negotiations during the mediation phase of Med-
Arb.201 If Venezuela and Dominica agree to engage in Med-Arb to
settle their dispute over Aves Island, then they are also likely to
recognize any resulting award because their initial consent would
legitimize the Med-Arb procedures and award.
20 2
195. See Peter, supra note 23, at 103 (recalling that I.B.M. and Fujitsu documented
their consent to be bound by Med-Arb's subsequent processes in an agreement they
formed during the initial phase of Med-Arb).
196. See id. at 103-04 (commenting that the parties' initial framework agreement
encompassed the details of the parties' future negotiations, mediation, arbitration,
negotiated rule-making and other various dispute resolution procedures).
197. Cf. id. (noting that Med-Arb facilitated various agreements which made the
parties' successive dispute resolution process more effective).
198. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 156 (adding that even partial agreements are
beneficial because they allow the parties to resolve certain factual issues).
199. See Peters, supra note 11, at 26-27 (emphasizing that cooperation is integral to
the effective enforcement of decisions).
200. See Peter, supra note 23, at 105 (suggesting that Med-Arb allows disputing
states to establish a relationship for future cooperation which, in turn, increases the
likelihood for compliance and definitive resolution of the dispute).
201. See id. at 106 (suggesting parties that reach an agreement during Med-Arb's
mediation phase increase the likelihood that Med-Arb will effectively settle the
dispute).
202. See Peters, supra note 11, at 6-7 (theorizing that methods of dispute resolution
which avoid a "winner-takes-all solution" but rather reach a consensual agreement
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LB.M. v. Fujitsu also illustrates that Med-Arb encourages
mutually favorable agreements by allowing disputing parties to
autonomously select resolution procedures.2 °3 If Venezuela and
Dominica autonomously set Med-Arb procedures and guidelines,
they are more likely to comply with an award. 204 Even if Vene-
zuela and Dominica fail to reach a complete agreement during the
initial mediation phase, they may agree to a binding award issued
during Med-Arb's arbitration phase.2 °5 This process will allow
Venezuela and Dominica to draft enforcement clauses which offer
the parties various forums in which to seek enforcement of the
award.20 s Thus, because this approach offers more autonomy and
flexibility during Med-Arb's processes, Venezuela and Dominica
are more likely to recognize a Med-Arb award as legitimate and
binding than an award that results from compulsory
arbitration." 7
B. Venezuela and Dominica Should Engage in Med-
Arb Because it Will Add Efficiency to Their
Dispute Resolution Process
Med-Arb may also increase the procedural efficiency of Vene-
zuela and Dominica's dispute settlement by allowing both states
to capitalize on the advantages and efficiencies of both mediation
and arbitration in resolving their dispute.2 8 In I.B.M. v. Fujitsu,
are more effective and likely to encourage compliance). Because Med-Arb is
consistent with the sovereignty of Venezuela and Dominica and will foster a mutually
beneficial agreement, Venezuela and Dominica will likely comply with any resulting
award. Id.
203. See generally Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 13T-
117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.) (allowing I.B.M. and Fujitsu to
autonomously set the procedures of mediation and arbitration during their dispute
settlement).
204. Cf id. at 29, n.3 (noting that both I.B.M. and Fujitsu agreed to abide by the
arbitral rules of the American Arbitration Association). Such agreement made the
dispute resolution process and compliance therewith more effective. Id.
205. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 161 (indicating that Med-Arb awards vest "the
settlement agreement reached by parties" with legal effect). Similarly, Venezuela and
Dominica may agree for a Med-Arb award to have binding effect on both states. Id.
206. See New York Convention, supra note 92, art. 1 (granting signatories the right
to seek enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in host countries). The enforcing court
may not, however, impose "more onerous conditions or higher fees" than that imposed
for domestic awards. Id. art. 3.
207. See Katz, supra note 59, at 111 (stating that international dispute resolution
encourages effective settlement and compliance because it causes parties to trust the
impartiality of its awards).
208. See Peter, supra note 23, at 105 (emphasizing that the mediator's ability to
tailor Med-Arb's subsequent arbitration phase is one of Med-Arb's major procedural
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the arbiters were initially unsuccessful in their attempt to resolve
209a dispute through engaging in various unstructured processes.
Ultimately, the arbiters streamlined the dispute resolution pro-
cess by employing a formal two-step Med-Arb process, which con-
210served significant resources.
Likewise, Venezuela and Dominica will profit procedurally by
engaging in Med-Arb and conserving resources. 211 For example, if
Venezuela and Dominica reach an agreement during the initial
mediation phase, the arbiters may save resources typically
required to determine allocations of fault in the dispute.212 Med-
Arb also allows disputing states such as Venezuela and Dominica
to resolve preliminary issues in the mediation phase and thus
reduce the number of outstanding issues subject to arbitration in
Med-Arb's subsequent arbitration phase. 21 '3 Even if Venezuela and
Dominica fail to reach a complete agreement in the initial media-
tion phase of Med-Arb, a third-party mediator will transition into
the role of a third-party arbiter equipped with standard arbiter
duties and enforcement capabilities.2 4
As illustrated in I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, this role change will add
efficiency to the resolution of the Aves Island dispute because such
arbiters may focus on the core interests and settlement goals of
Venezuela and Dominica, instead of determining their rights as
sovereign states.2"5 In addition, third-party arbiters may elimi-
nate fact-intensive discovery in disputes such as that over Aves
Island where they are already familiar with the dispute and its
advantages in terms of efficiency); see also De Vera, supra note 60, at 155 ("[T]he
Med-Arb process is intended to allow the parties to profit from the advantages of both
dispute settlement procedures"). But see id. (considering that cultural differences
may undermine the efficiency of Med-Arb).
209. See Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb. Ass'n No. 13T-117-
0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.).
210. See Peter, supra note 23, at 104 (indicating that Med-Arb allowed I.B.M. and
Fujitsu to conserve time and money in their settlement procedures).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 106 (implying that the time necessary to allocate the fault of
disputing parties decreases the efficiency of dispute resolution).
213. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 156-57 (averring that disputing parties that
reach agreement during Med-Arb's initial phase significantly increase the efficiency
of the subsequent arbitration phase by resolving preliminary, factual issues).
214. See Peter, supra note 23, at 98 (discussing the opportunity for parties to
engage in a modified version of Med-Arb where they question the mediator's validity
as an arbiter).
215. See id. at 105-06 (discussing how the third-party mediator's transition into an
arbiter role increases Med-Arb's efficiency by allowing the arbiter to focus on the goals
of settlement rather than the parties' entitlements).
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facts.216 This allows the arbiters to save time and discovery
expenses, thereby promoting procedural efficiencies which com-
pulsory arbitration may lack.217
V. CONCLUSION
States contribute to international peace and security by
resolving disputes through accepted means of dispute resolu-
tion.218 U.N. Member States are entitled to select from a myriad of
acceptable dispute settlement mechanisms in resolving their dis-
putes.219 Compulsory, standardized arbitration is unlikely to
effectively resolve the Aves Island dispute, however, because it
undermines state sovereignty by dispensing with Venezuela's and
Dominica's right to consent to dispute resolution and deprives
them of their right to self-determination.22 °
If the U.N. subjects the Aves Island dispute to compulsory
arbitration, it will encourage settlement noncompliance, expose
the U.N. Security Council's inability to enforce noncompliance,
and foster inefficiencies in the resolution of their dispute.221
Instead, the U.N. should provide a forum in which Venezuela and
Dominica may engage in Med-Arb to maximize the efficacy and
efficiency of their dispute resolution process. 222 By engaging in
Med-Arb, Venezuela and Dominica may reach a mutually benefi-
cial agreement, foster settlement compliance, further interna-
216. See id. at 106 (noting the mediator's deeper understanding of the dispute
makes the arbitration phase more efficient because the arbiter bases a decision on a
broader comprehension of the dispute).
217. See De Vera, supra note 60, at 156-57 (suggesting the time and discovery
expenses which the third-party facilitator saves during Med-Arb directly translates
into a more efficient dispute settlement process for the parties employing Med-Arb).
218. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 122 (implying that the objective of international
law is to resolve disputes before they escalate to armed conflict, thereby furthering
international peace and security).
219. See supra Part I.B (discussing the internationally accepted means of dispute
resolution set forth in the U.N. Charter).
220. See supra Part II.A (arguing that the U.N. should not subject the Ayes Island
dispute to compulsory jurisdiction because it violates their state sovereignty and right
to self-determination under Articles 2 and 55 of the U.N. Charter).
221. See supra Parts II.B, II.C (claiming a requirement that Venezuela and
Dominica engage in compulsory arbitration may lead to noncompliance,
unenforceable awards, and inefficiencies in their dispute resolution process).
222. See supra Parts III.A, III.B (predicting that Med-Arb will make resolution of
Venezuela's and Dominica's dispute more effective and efficient because it will
encourage both states to cooperate during settlement, increase compliance with a
resulting award, reduce costs and time requirements, and reduce the number of
issues the I.C.J. must review).
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tional peace and security for all states affected, and set a
precedent for diplomatic resolution of disputes in the future.223
223. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 122, 125 (noting dispute resolution is effective if
it prevents states from resorting to force to resolve disputes, thereby contributing to
international peace and security).
20061 223
